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thoroughfares on the one hand and uncharted administrative discretion plus public parks on the other does not arise here in full,
although an administrative finding that the bus service was reasonable
and not uncomfortable- vague concepts at best- was calmly accepted by the majority. The factor of compulsion hardly bears analysis;
one can buy or rent a car, hire a taxi, or walk, without contributing
one cent to a privately owned transit company, but he is compelled
by taxes to finance his public parks. Again, what passes for music
today may frequently not appear as such to musicians, but at least
it is less objectionable to the intelligent adult than blaring exhortations to embrace a different religion or to accept a political platform
or candidate at face value.
In all probability the Court was heavily influenced by the carefully compiled record and by the desire of a large majority of the
passengers to hear the broadcasts, coupled with the fact that each
program was predominantly musical, presented no propaganda other
than a few advertising puffs, was governmentally regulated on behalf
of the public, 2 2 and was broadcast at a volume enabling the person
of normal sensibilities to ignore it. Any future deviation from these
standards may well evoke a converse ruling.
JAMES LAWRENCE KING

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
MOTION PICTURES
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)
Appellant, a New York motion picture distributing corporation,
obtained a license for the commercial exhibition of an Italian film,
The Miracle'. The film was exhibited for eight weeks as part of a
22See p. 464: "Streetcars and busses ... are for the common use of all of their
passengers. The Federal Government in its regulation of them is not only entitled,

but is required, to take into consideration the interests of all concerned."
2N. Y. EDUc. LAW §129 makes it unlawful to exhibit or release for exhibition for
commercial advantage any motion picture not validly licensed by the Department

of Education; §122 charges the director of the motion picture division of this department with the duty of examining submitted motion pictures and issuing a
license unless the film is "obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or ...
its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime . . . "
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trilogy, Ways of Love, and occasioned comment and action, pro and
con, by militant minorities.2 The Chancellor of the New York Board
of Regents, acting under statutory authority,3 caused a committee to
review the film, with the result that the allegations of its sacrilegious
character were sustained. Upon failure of appellant at subsequent
hearing to show cause why its license to exhibit this film should not be
revoked the Commissioner of Education, acting on order of the Board
of Regents, revoked the license. On review 4 the appellate division
upheld the order of the Board of Regents;5 the court of appeals affirmed;6 and appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court.7
HELD the New York motion picture licensing act is a state abridgment
of freedom of speech and press and violates the Fourteenth Amendment s in that it establishes as a prerequisite to exhibition censorial
approval governed by a standard as vague as the "sacrilegious" test.9
Judgment reversed, with separate concurring opinions by Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson jointly and by Justice Reed.
During the period of flux following the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment the guarantees of free speech and press contained in the
First Amendment were assumed to be still inapplicable as restrictions
on state action.10 In 1915, while this assumption prevailed, an Ohio
movie censorship statute was attacked in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio"l on several grounds, including alleged
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal district court
held the first eight amendments inapplicable to state action,1 2 and on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court the sole point argued was
2At pp. 509-516 of the opinion.
aN. Y. EDuc. LAw §101 (Board of Regents head of Education Department);
§124 (Board of Regents may review denial of license).
4

Pursuant to N.Y. Civ. PP.AC. AcT §§1283 et seq.; N.Y. EDUC.
5278 App. Div. 253, 104 N.Y.S.2d 740 (3d Dep't 1951).

LAw

§124.

6303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665 (1951).

7Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(2) (Supp. 1952).
sThe current theory of the Court assumes that the First Amendment prohibitions

of federal action are implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth and accordingly apply to state action also.
9See also Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (city ordinance banning movies
"prejudicial to the best interests of the people" struck down for indefiniteness).
'oSee, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922); see Kittleson
and Smith, Free Speech: Slogans v. States' Rights, 5 U. OF FLA. L. Rxv. 227, 237
(1952).
11236 U.S. 230 (1915).

12Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 215 Fed. 138 (N.D. Ohio 1914).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1953], Art. 6
CASE COMMENTS
alleged violation of the Ohio Constitution. In a broadly worded
opinion, however, the Court impliedly excluded motion pictures from
3
that class of communicative media entitled to speak or write freely?1
Subsequently, beginning in 1925, a line of decisions repudiated the
earlier assumption of the inapplicability of the content of the First
Amendment against state action and adopted the position that freedom of speech and press were protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4 Following this interpretation the Court
indicated in several dicta a desire to review the Mutual decision. 5
Nevertheless, when the opportunity arose in the instant case the Court
narrowly restricted its reversal: "We hold only that under the First
and the Fourteenth Amendments a state may not ban a film on the
basis of the censor's conclusion that it is 'sacrilegious' .... ,.8
From the above caveat of the majority through the special concurrence of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson'? to the words of Justice
Reed s the opinions studiously avoid enunciating a general rule. This
wariness in expression may be due in part to the current reluctance of
the Court to declare unconstitutional any federal or state acts limiting
economic or social freedom or curtailing acquisition and enjoyment
of property, and to its highly erratic actions in the so-called civil
liberties field. 9 On the other hand, the instant case is the first to
accord protective consideration to a complex pictorial medium transmitting its message through several highly refined arts and thereby
13Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915):
the exhibition of motion pictures is a business ... originated and conducted
for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by
...

the Ohio constitution ... as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public
opinion."
14Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925): "Freedom of speech and of the
press- which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress
- are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."
Cf. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1938); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
15E.g., see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948):
. we have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment ....
'6At p. 506.
17At pp. 507-533.

'sAt pp. 506-507.
I9See Kittleson and Smith, supra note 10, at 236-240; Richardson, Freedom of

Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 Htav. L. Rv. 1 (1951).
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differing radically from all other previously protected forms of communication.
Although the effect of the instant decision is to raise the motion
picture to the status of a protected form of communication, the precise character of the state law involved will largely determine the
force of the judicial impact. Such laws fall generally into three categories: prior restraint, subsequent restraint, and "blue laws."
At least one fourth of the states have censorship laws employing
prior restraint by license in the realm of direct censorship, 20 and a
few have restricted their censorship to obscene or indecent films. 21
Florida, in a statute that requires no license but provides a general
penalty for violation of its terms, 22 bases authority to exhibit on the
approval of the national board of review or the New York censorship
board.
In spite of the Court's condemnation of censorship by prior restraint 23 these statutes are not necessarily void. The Court points out
that exceptions exist, 24 and elsewhere recognizes certain classes of unprotected speech, including the lewd, obscene, and libelous, 25 thereby
20E.g., CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. §3702 (1949); FLA. STAT. §§521.01-521.04 (1951);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§51.101-51.112 (1949); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§4:301-4:307
(West Supp. 1951); MD. ANN. CODE C. 66A (1951); N.Y. EDUc. LAW §129; OHIO CODE
ANN. §154-47 (Page Supp. 1952); PA. STAT. tit. 4, §§41-57 (Cum.Supp. 1952); VA.
CODE tit. 2, §§98-116 (Supp. 1952).
21E.g., VA. CODE tit. 2, §98 (Supp. 1952).
2
2FLA. STAT. §521.02 (1951): "It is unlawful for any person to display, exhibit or
promulgate in the State of Florida any motion picture film that has not been approved by the national board of review, its appointees or successors, or by the state
censorship board of the State of New York." Sec. 521.04 provides a general penalty
for violation.
23At p. 503: "... such a previous restraint is a form of infringment on freedom
of expression to be especially condemned ....
" citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
24Ibid. The Court quoted p. 716 of the Near case, supra note 23: "The protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation
has been recognized only in exceptional cases ......
25As Justice Murphy conceded in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571 (1942): "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by their utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." But see Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 82 (1949), for language indicating prohibition of prior censorship. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 752 (1952) (constitutionality of group
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indicating that some of these classes, notably obscene communications,
embrace motion pictures and permit prior restraint whenever the
standards governing it are dearly expressed. Statutes barring obscene
films, as well as those portions of the New York statute not condemned
in the instant case, accordingly remain valid. Florida, inasmuch as its
censorship is based on that of the New York Board of Regents, will
have to permit the showing of The Miracle, but it can still prohibit
the exhibition of films banned in New York for their obscene, indecent,
immoral, and perhaps even inhuman qualities. 2 Even if the protection
of prior restraint statutes were stripped away, the majority of states
would still have, as has Florida, a subsequently restraining general
statute prohibiting the possession or showing of obscene or indecent
films. 27 As an exercise of the police power to protect public morals
such a statute is not in danger of being overthrown if its standards
are sufficiently definite to comply with due process.
The third class of laws to be brought to test under the First Amendment provisions implicit in the Fourteenth are the "blue laws" prohibiting the exhibition of motion pictures on Sundays or certain holidays. These enactments, whether based on local option,28 state-wide
referendum, 29 or implied absolute prohibition, 3° are often the focal
point of local dissension 31 and therefore seem destined now for constitutional testing. The problem is unique in this context, inasmuch
libel prohibition); Kittleson and Smith, supra note 10, at 227, 233.

26Another question, beyond the scope of this Comment, is the possible invalidity
of FLA. STAT. §521.02 (1951) as an attempt to delegate formulation of Florida substantive law to an agency outside the state; see Florida Industrial Comm'n v. State
ex reL Orange State Oil Co., 155 Fla. 772, 21 So.2d 599 (1945), especially at 780, 21
So.2d at 603.
27FLA. STAT. §§847.01-847.03 (1951).
28E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §421 (Supp. 1951); MIss. CODE ANN. §2370 (Cum.
Supp. 1952); VT. REV. STAT. §8568 (1947).
9
2 E.g., PA. STAT. tit. 4, §§60-66 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
30E.g., S.C. CODE §§1732-1737, as modified, Supp. 1941, 1942, 1948; see note 31

infra.
31S.C. CODE §1737-1 (1941) impliedly amended c. 82, which sets forth the South
Carolina blue laws, by authorizing issuance of a local permit to show motion pictures
after 2:00 P.M. on Sundays in only those counties with military bases, provided such
schedule does not conflict with church services. This law was effective for only two
years, but in 1942 it was extended for the duration of World War II. In 1948
§1732-2 extended the permission to certain population brackets, including most
resorts, thereby indicating reluctant response to pressure by vacationers and business
men in vacation areas.
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